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Hugh Millen analysis: What really happened on Richard Sherman’s picks, how Seahawks stuffed 49ers’ run
Hugh Millen explains how Richard Sherman picked off to Colin Kaepernick passes and how the Seahawks stopped Frank Gore early in the game.
The Seahawks’ reclaimed dominance may be as simple as a return to health — particularly on defense, where they now have all anticipated starters back except Brandon Mebane.
Not bad for this juncture in the season.
Seattle appears to again be playing the hunter, not the hunted Super Bowl champs. My thoughts on Thursday’s 19-3 victory over the San Francisco 49ers:
• Demarcus Dobbs’ stuff of Frank Gore: Dobbs’ first-quarter penetration resulted in just a 1-yard loss, but the hard hit represented a larger statement about the night Gore would endure. Dobbs was credited with the tackle and the acclaim, but it was primarily Kevin Williams who made the play.
The 49ers ran a gap-scheme “counter” play, meaning at the point of attack over left tackle the blockers down-block (each protecting the inside “gap” if Seattle blitzes) while the backside guard kicks out the end man on the line of scrimmage (in this case Alex Boone blocking Bruce Irvin outward). The scheme also calls for tight end Vernon Davis to follow Boone and block Bobby Wagner.
But Davis was pulling from a wide alignment on the right side and had far to travel to Wagner over the left-tackle area. Williams, playing in Mebane’s “one technique” nose-guard position over the center’s shoulder, got penetration against Pro Bowler Mike Iupati and completely derailed Davis’ path to Wagner. With the unblocked Wagner awaiting him in the designated hole, Gore ran inside of the play’s design and into Dobbs, who was losing his battle against Joe Staley’s down block.
The 49ers wanted to have their pumpkin pie and eat it too — i.e. they wanted to align Davis wide to be a contributor in the passing and strong-side running games while also helping on backside counters and other gap-scheme power plays that are their staple. But Seattle showed it had nose guards other than Mebane capable of destroying such schemes. Gore’s total for the night: 10 carries, 28 yards.
• Richard Sherman’s playmaking: 49er quarterback Colin Kaepernick had a 0.0 passer rating when attacking Seahawks cornerback Richard Sherman. For context, had Kaepernick thrown every pass to the cheerleaders his rating would have been 39.6.
On the 49ers’ first third-down play with 6 yards to go and Seattle in press-man coverage, Kaepernick declined a 6-yard out route to Anquan Boldin against Byron Maxwell, declined a slant route on the single-receiver side against Therold Simon, and declined a go route to Davis, one of the league’s fastest tight ends matched against Kam Chancellor. Instead, he chose a deep vertical route against Richard Sherman to Brandon Lloyd — who has just 12 catches on 41 percent of the passes thrown to him this season. Maybe Kaepernick was seeking to make amends for the pick at the end of the NFC Championship Game?
Sherman’s first interception was a gift on a platter. Sherman was fairly adequate in coverage against Lloyd, who was running a comeback route off an intermediate stutter move. A decent throw outside would have beaten Sherman, but Kaepernick inexplicably left the ball several yards inside despite no pressure and a clean line of vision. Sherman is usually at his best in press coverage, but as part of an eight-man zone, he backed off the line of scrimmage before the snap while facing inward and looking at the quarterback (known as bale technique). Sherman had a clear look at Kaepernick and capitalized on the mistake.
Sherman’s second pick was more impressive and was aided by Seattle’s scheme and the speed of Wagner. Seattle played Cover 1, man-to-man with a free safety. This coverage usually allows for a five-man rush, but with no one assigned to the quarterback, Kaepernick’s ability to scramble has annihilated this coverage. So Seattle on Thursday played Cover 1 with just four rushers, using Wagner as an extra defender spying Kaepernick. On this play Seattle had scant pressure, yet the 49ers’ quarterback escaped the pocket to try to make a big play against coverage disorted in response to Kaepernick’s run threat. Sherman, from his customary press technique, first blanketed Stevie Johnson on a hitch, or short hook route, then shadowed him as Johnson released up the sideline. When Wagner quickly closed on the harried Kaepernick, the quarterback tried to float a ball over Sherman, who rose for another easy pick.
• Game balls: Kaepernick didn’t a complete a pass of more than 10 yards from the line of scrimmage. So four game balls go to all four starters of the Legion of Boom — Sherman, Maxwell, Chancellor and Earl Thomas.
Hugh Millen analysis: What really happened on Richard Sherman’s picks, how Seahawks stuffed 49ers’ run | Seahawks | The Seattle Times
Hugh Millen explains how Richard Sherman picked off to Colin Kaepernick passes and how the Seahawks stopped Frank Gore early in the game.
The Seahawks’ reclaimed dominance may be as simple as a return to health — particularly on defense, where they now have all anticipated starters back except Brandon Mebane.
Not bad for this juncture in the season.
Seattle appears to again be playing the hunter, not the hunted Super Bowl champs. My thoughts on Thursday’s 19-3 victory over the San Francisco 49ers:
• Demarcus Dobbs’ stuff of Frank Gore: Dobbs’ first-quarter penetration resulted in just a 1-yard loss, but the hard hit represented a larger statement about the night Gore would endure. Dobbs was credited with the tackle and the acclaim, but it was primarily Kevin Williams who made the play.
The 49ers ran a gap-scheme “counter” play, meaning at the point of attack over left tackle the blockers down-block (each protecting the inside “gap” if Seattle blitzes) while the backside guard kicks out the end man on the line of scrimmage (in this case Alex Boone blocking Bruce Irvin outward). The scheme also calls for tight end Vernon Davis to follow Boone and block Bobby Wagner.
But Davis was pulling from a wide alignment on the right side and had far to travel to Wagner over the left-tackle area. Williams, playing in Mebane’s “one technique” nose-guard position over the center’s shoulder, got penetration against Pro Bowler Mike Iupati and completely derailed Davis’ path to Wagner. With the unblocked Wagner awaiting him in the designated hole, Gore ran inside of the play’s design and into Dobbs, who was losing his battle against Joe Staley’s down block.
The 49ers wanted to have their pumpkin pie and eat it too — i.e. they wanted to align Davis wide to be a contributor in the passing and strong-side running games while also helping on backside counters and other gap-scheme power plays that are their staple. But Seattle showed it had nose guards other than Mebane capable of destroying such schemes. Gore’s total for the night: 10 carries, 28 yards.
• Richard Sherman’s playmaking: 49er quarterback Colin Kaepernick had a 0.0 passer rating when attacking Seahawks cornerback Richard Sherman. For context, had Kaepernick thrown every pass to the cheerleaders his rating would have been 39.6.
On the 49ers’ first third-down play with 6 yards to go and Seattle in press-man coverage, Kaepernick declined a 6-yard out route to Anquan Boldin against Byron Maxwell, declined a slant route on the single-receiver side against Therold Simon, and declined a go route to Davis, one of the league’s fastest tight ends matched against Kam Chancellor. Instead, he chose a deep vertical route against Richard Sherman to Brandon Lloyd — who has just 12 catches on 41 percent of the passes thrown to him this season. Maybe Kaepernick was seeking to make amends for the pick at the end of the NFC Championship Game?
Sherman’s first interception was a gift on a platter. Sherman was fairly adequate in coverage against Lloyd, who was running a comeback route off an intermediate stutter move. A decent throw outside would have beaten Sherman, but Kaepernick inexplicably left the ball several yards inside despite no pressure and a clean line of vision. Sherman is usually at his best in press coverage, but as part of an eight-man zone, he backed off the line of scrimmage before the snap while facing inward and looking at the quarterback (known as bale technique). Sherman had a clear look at Kaepernick and capitalized on the mistake.
Sherman’s second pick was more impressive and was aided by Seattle’s scheme and the speed of Wagner. Seattle played Cover 1, man-to-man with a free safety. This coverage usually allows for a five-man rush, but with no one assigned to the quarterback, Kaepernick’s ability to scramble has annihilated this coverage. So Seattle on Thursday played Cover 1 with just four rushers, using Wagner as an extra defender spying Kaepernick. On this play Seattle had scant pressure, yet the 49ers’ quarterback escaped the pocket to try to make a big play against coverage disorted in response to Kaepernick’s run threat. Sherman, from his customary press technique, first blanketed Stevie Johnson on a hitch, or short hook route, then shadowed him as Johnson released up the sideline. When Wagner quickly closed on the harried Kaepernick, the quarterback tried to float a ball over Sherman, who rose for another easy pick.
• Game balls: Kaepernick didn’t a complete a pass of more than 10 yards from the line of scrimmage. So four game balls go to all four starters of the Legion of Boom — Sherman, Maxwell, Chancellor and Earl Thomas.
Hugh Millen analysis: What really happened on Richard Sherman’s picks, how Seahawks stuffed 49ers’ run | Seahawks | The Seattle Times
