Goran Dragic chances to be named west allstar reserve?

[JahiiCarson_SqodGeneral]

For Sting:
Put this vid on the A or B thread in basketball forum and say from Jahii........ I am banned from those forums!

The Morris twins are passing..................... Not to each other.......

 

[JahiiCarson_SqodGeneral]

Looks like Dragic isnt making it.

 

[GMATCa]

GMAT how dangerous could this team be with a healthy Dragic and Bledsoe for a full season. 12-3 in December.........

Are we talking top 3 seed in west? Obviously I want to upgrade the SF. I love Frye because his ability to pick n pop is what teams like the Pacers cant figure out.......

Man what this team would do with a Shawn Marion type versatile stud, with the same quickness and all around game as the Matrix........ PJ is a great guy to bring off the bench I think and his ability to come in and lock up sixth man or smaller guards is big hes like a Lou Amunson except more impactful on a consistant bases. You cant get rid of PJ hes a glue guy in the locker room, but hes more of a 2 I think..... A more all around SF like an IGGY or Matrix but I really like Aaron Gordon.


Dragic and Bledsoe back court I think can take us deep in the playoffs!

Well, I go back to this ...

Kevin Johnson and Jason Kidd played 82 regular season games together over two seasons. In those 82 games, the Suns went 57-25 (.695). In their last 76 regular season games together, the Suns went 55-21 (.724, a 59-win pace). In their last 43 regular season games together where K.J. played at least 30 minutes, the Suns went 35-8 (.814, a 67-win pace). And when K.J. played at least 30 minutes in the '97-'98 regular season, the Suns went 15-2 (.882, a 72-win pace).

Now, K.J. missed 31 consecutive games that year due to knee surgery (for basically the same problem that Bledsoe is dealing with), but even so, Phoenix would have possessed a shot at the league's best record had head coach Danny Ainge not prematurely reduced Johnson's role. K.J. was actually going to retire the previous summer, in 1997, even though he'd been the second-best guard in the NBA during the '96-'97 season, after Jordan (regardless of what the moronic NBA writers thought). But after some serious coaxing by Jerry Colangelo, K.J. decided to return, motivated by the idea of taking one more shot at a championship. Ainge, however, developed different ideas, deciding that he would use Johnson on more of a "break him out if I think we need him" basis. As the head coach said after the Suns' seventh game of the '97-'98 season:

Kevin (Johnson) was the best player on the court tonight. He came up huge when we needed him. It is good that we don't have to use KJ every game, but it is nice to have him there.

11/16/1997 NBA Box Score at PHO - basketballreference.com

Two games later, Ainge shifted K.J. to the bench, even though the guard had averaged 24.0 points, 7.0 assists, 8.7 rebounds, a .581 field goal percentage, and an .846 free throw percentage in 8.7 FTA per contest over the previous three games (a .661 True Shooting Percentage).

Even after the knee surgery, K.J. made four starts in the season's second half, averaging 16.5 points, 7.0 assists, just 1.8 turnovers, a 4.00:1.00 assists-to-turnover ratio, a .512 field goal percentage, and a .957 free throw percentage in 5.8 FTA per contest (.621 True Shooting Percentage), in a modest 31.8 minutes. The Suns went 3-1.

But Ainge only gave K.J. those four starts (plus one in the playoffs, where Johnson posted a team-high 18 points on 8-14 field goal shooting, plus 7 assists).

The Suns still won 56 games that year. But, oh, how much better could they have been if Ainge had consistently stuck with a two-point guard offense, with K.J. playing a major role alongside Kidd? Again, Phoenix went 15-2 in that regular season when K.J. played at least 30 minutes.

Now, Dragic and Bledsoe aren't quite on the playmaking level of K.J. and Kidd, but both Dragic and Bledsoe are vastly more efficient scorers than Kidd. Moreover, today's NBA—with all the court spacing, the three-point shooting, the use of the deep corners, the 'stretch fours,' the revamped defensive three seconds rule, and the crackdown on hand checking and forearm checking—is much more conducive to these types of guards than the NBA of sixteen years ago. Now everything is geared toward opening the court to maximize the pick-and-roll/pop and drivers. Thus with Dragic and Bledsoe together, the Suns could absolutely leapfrog the Clippers in the Pacific.

I really like what McDonough and Hornacek have done; they remind me of Bryan Colangelo and Mike D'Antoni eight-to-ten years ago in the sense that they have formulated a coherent concept and philosophy, and they have assembled a set of personnel that fits the philosophy and fits together. McDonough and Hornacek are unconventional, they think outside the box, they're more concerned with cohesion and the meshing of talent than with name recognition, and they see the game holistically and with flexibility. Their approach is opposite of what Jim Buss and Mitch Kupchak tried to do with the Lakers, where they attempted to build a 'Dream Team' with a star at each 'position,' with little regard for how the players would complement each other, how they would hold up athletically and defensively, and whether they could build coherency. Now the Lakers are a disaster, and the Suns—even without Bledsoe—are on the rise.

And the McDonough/Hornacek 'program' could end up being preferable to the Colangeo/D'Antoni one because it's less dependent on one player. Presuming that the Suns re-sign Bledsoe, which I believe will be the case, the team can still stay afloat if he is out, or if Dragic is out. Moreover, Dragic and Bledsoe give the Suns two starting guards who are good at both offense and defense, something that Phoenix hasn't seen in a long time, maybe not since K.J. and Kidd. Now if you're struggling in a certain matchup, you possess options and flexibility; you can switch your assignments, or alternate, and possibly gain some traction. Consider that the Suns got back into the 1993 NBA Finals in Game Three at Chicago by scrambling their defensive assignments. See the first six minutes of this video:

[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=udxsmKTaDUQ]1992-93 Chicago Bulls: Three-Peat Part 3/4 - YouTube[/ame]

Something similar happened in Chicago's favor two years earlier in the 1991 Finals, when Jordan (the game's best defensive guard, in addition to being the best offensive guard) encountered foul trouble while defending Magic Johnson. But with Scottie Pippen, the Bulls were not in trouble. See this video, beginning at the eight-minute mark:

[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pvtH2wNGB5o]Chicago Bulls 1991 NBA Championship Part 3 - YouTube[/ame]

And Tucker will give the Suns yet another option; Phoenix won't need to hide anyone defensively, which wasn't necessarily the case over the previous decade.

Now, that's not to say that we should write the Suns into the NBA Finals anytime soon; plenty of development and enhancement will need to occur before they can reach that point. But what I'm saying is that Phoenix's roster and approach are more flexible and versatile now than at any time since the 1990s. Also keep in mind that Detroit won two championships a quarter of a century ago by playing three guards (Isiah Thomas, Joe Dumars, Vinnie Johnson) who were virtually interchangeable, and with one of the first big men (Bill Laimbeer) who would pick-and-pop way out on the perimeter, even beyond the three-point arc.

Those Pistons won championships without possessing anywhere near the best player in the game (Jordan, Magic, Bird, Barkley, Malone, or the superstar centers, namely Ewing, Olajuwon, and Robinson). None of their players were the best, or close to the best, at any of their respective positions. Even Isiah Thomas, as good as he happened to be, was not on the level of Magic Johnson or Kevin Johnson (who proved even more explosive and far more efficient than Thomas) by that time. Thomas may not have been on the level of John Stockton, either, given that Stockton, too, proved vastly more efficient. Joe Dumars was terrific and efficient on both sides of the ball, but nowhere near the overall level of Jordan or Clyde Drexler. And at the other positions, forget it: the Pistons probably didn't possess a top-five player at any of the three frontcourt spots. Yet they were versatile, flexible, democratic, and deep; they didn't rely on any one player to dominate or carry them, while any of four or five players could take over at a given time. They also possessed some frontcourt players who could really shoot from outside and thus create more space for their guards to drive and create.

The 2004 Pistons won a championship in a similar mode, as did the 1979 Sonics. Of course, all those teams proved elite defensively, and the Suns will need time to develop that level of defensive efficiency. But for the first time in awhile, Phoenix actually possesses a number of good defensive pieces to work with.

The point, though, is that no one should think that just because the Suns lack a superstar such as LeBron James, Kevin Durant, or Kobe Bryant, or anyone who is likely to receive an MVP Award or average 25.0 points per game, that they cannot win a championship. If you possess versatility, flexibility, depth, defensive potential, big men who can shoot, and multiple guards who can run the offense, create off the dribble, and shoot, then there is a path to a title.

 

[GMATCa]

Looks like Dragic isnt making it.

Yeah, they went with Lillard, that's a shame. I thought that Dragic's surge would give him the edge, but alas; kudos to Davis_Mike for making the correct call.

Anthony Davis is the other notable snub.

 

[Arizona_Sting]

I bet Davis replaces Bryant.

 

[GMATCa]

Jahii-

Yeah, I think that Bledsoe can become acceptable as a spot-up shooter. His development in that area will come down to experience and comfort, and he should grow in those regards by continuing to play with Dragic and learning how to be effective when he is not the primary ball-handler during a possession.

In the two seasons where K.J. averaged more than 0.59 three-point field goal attempts per game, '95-'96 (1.0 FGA) and '96-'97 (2.9 FGA), he actually shot a combined .425 on threes. In '96-'97, K.J. ranked third in the entire NBA in three-point field goal percentage at .441 (89-202), trailing only Glen Rice and Steve Kerr.

databaseBasketball.com - NBA Basketball Statistics, Draft, Awards, and History

Granted, the three-point arc was a little shorter in those years, at an even twenty-two feet, but K.J. finished directly ahead of such vintage marksmen as Joe Dumars, Mitch Richmond, Reggie Miller, and Dell Curry.

Indeed, K.J. became the first player in NBA history to rank in the top-three in assists per game and three-point field goal percentage in the same season. He has since been joined only by John Stockton in 2001 and Steve Nash in 2007 and 2008.

During one game in March 1997, K.J. shot 6-10 on threes at Seattle:

03/26/1997 NBA Box Score at sea - basketballreference.com

That performance completed a four-game stretch where K.J. shot .619 on threes (13-21) in 5.3 attempts per contest.

Kevin Johnson 1996-97 Game Log | Basketball-Reference.com (Scroll down on these things.)

Then over the regular season's final five games, K.J. shot .467 on threes (14-30) in 6.0 attempts per contest.

Kevin Johnson 1996-97 Game Log | Basketball-Reference.com

K.J. also shot .513 on threes (20-39) for the month of February 1997 (he shot .590 from the field that month and posted a .731 True Shooting Percentage), including one two-game stretch where he shot 5-5 on threes, 16-20 from the field (.800), and 12-12 from the free throw line, for a two-game True Shooting Percentage of .969.

Kevin Johnson 1996-97 Game Log | Basketball-Reference.com

Kevin Johnson 1996-97 Game Log | Basketball-Reference.com

The reason why K.J. did not shoot threes earlier in his career is multifaceted. First, when he entered the NBA in 1987, hardly anyone shot threes. At most, there were one or two three-point shooters per team (for instance, Byron Scott and Michael Cooper on the Lakers, and Larry Bird and Danny Ainge on the Celtics), and even they shot very modest volumes compared to current times. Indeed, in the first full season that K.J. and Hornacek played together, '88-'89, even Hornacek only averaged 1.0 three-point field goal attempts per game and connected at a mediocre .333 rate (although even .333 fell above the league average that year, which was just .323). The game was just that much different back then, with much less emphasis on court spacing and much more emphasis on body movement and ball movement. Indeed, two seasons later when the Suns famously scored 107 points in a half (and 173 for the game) versus Denver in November 1990, Phoenix produced all those points while shooting 0-2 on threes, as a team.

Denver Nuggets at Phoenix Suns Box Score, November 10, 1990 | Basketball-Reference.com

[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KstKYSTQjdI]1990 Suns Dunkathon vs Nuggets - YouTube[/ame]

And actually, in his first two NBA seasons, '86-'87 and '87-'88, Hornacek had shot a combined .287 on threes in 0.62 attempts per game. So when they began starting together in 1988, the reason why Hornacek generally played off the ball, as the clear-cut shooting guard, while K.J. constituted the clear-cut point guard, wasn't because of differences in three-point shooting. The reason was because K.J. had to be the point guard: his skills with the ball, including passing and shooting off the dribble, were too good, and his quickness proved astounding. You can see here, starting at the half-minute mark, how easily K.J. explodes past one of the league's top defenders, Michael Cooper, one-on-one, at the close of the first quarter of Game Three of the 1989 Western Conference Finals.

[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tK0iiO-X3EY]1989 Playoffs Lakers Suns Chick Hearn Mychal Thompson - YouTube[/ame]

He could distort and collapse defenses constantly, thus freeing teammates for better scoring opportunities, and he could do so when there was more of a premium on that ability given the relative lack of court spacing. Breaking down the defense proved more difficult in those days: driving lanes, passing lanes, and sight lanes were narrower, the paint was packed with bodies and defenders, frontcourts were taller, fouls were harder, and decision times were shorter.

Now, Hornacek was certainly crafty off the dribble, as you showed in that highlight compilation from his 36-point performance in Game Six of the 1990 Western Conference Finals, when K.J. pulled his hamstring late in the second quarter (while hitting a blind layup, skidding backwards off Portland center Kevin Duckworth's chest). But as Hubie Brown says there, Hornacek possessed "average foot speed." He offered some Steve Nash-type ability to throw off defenders with misdirection and timing, but so did Johnson; the difference is that K.J. did so with much more explosiveness and ease, thus rendering Hornacek more of an off-ball complement who would come off many a down-screen to shoot or drive. And although Hornacek had become a terrific three-point shooter by that time (.408 in '89-'90 in 1.5 FGA per contest), the shot still wasn't a substantial factor in his game, or the Suns' success—certainly not their playoff success. Phoenix reached consecutive Western Conference Finals in 1989 and 1990, but they did so while Hornacek shot a combined .194 (6-31) on threes in those two postseasons (in 28 games, or 1.1 FGA per contest).

So if Hornacek wasn't a prolific three-point gunner in those days, primarily playing off the ball, then K.J. certainly wasn't going to be looking for the shot while running the offense with the ball. The issue was really that he proved so good at everything else: at finding teammates for open shots (teammate Tim Perry stated that K.J. was "a lot like Magic Johnson" in that regard), at scoring at the rim, at slipping into his sweet spots for quick-release pull-up jumpers, and at reaching the free throw line. Indeed, K.J. actually attempted more free throws per game than Hakeem Olajuwon in 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, and 1997, and more free throws per game than Patrick Ewing in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1996. The fact that a 6'1" point guard was regularly attempting more free throws per contest than some superstar centers in that era is incredible. And even in his tenth season, 1997, when K.J. finally added the three-point shot to his arsenal in a major (and extremely efficient) way, he still averaged more free throw attempts per game than Michael Jordan, Allen Iverson, and every other guard in the NBA, except for a second-year Jerry Stackhouse. K.J. could record many an old-fashioned three-point play (the "and one"), and his ability to reach the free throw line in general rendered the three-point shot less integral for him than for a guy such as Steve Nash (or even Mark Price or John Stockton), who did not shoot nearly as many free throws. Conversely, if K.J. was shooting threes, he was foreclosing his opportunities to reach the free throw line, score in the lane, and create great shots for teammates. And if none of those opportunities materialized, he always had the pull-up jumper off the dribble as a default option inside the arc, and he could rise up and pop it at any time. It was, perhaps, the 'sickest' pull-up jumper in the game's history, and since K.J. could shoot it so smoothly and suddenly, he didn't need the extra spatial cushion that often comes with the three-point shot (and that often induces many guards to shoot high volumes of threes, even at inefficient rates).

 

[GMATCa]

(continued)

I think that what happened in 1997, when K.J. emerged as an elite three-point shooter, was that he just turned some of his pull-up jumpers from twenty or twenty-one feet, the jumpers that he would shoot in transition, or on the break, or off the pick-and roll, into treys by shooting them from two or three feet further out. Thus K.J. only averaged 9.8 two-point field goal attempts per game that season, his lowest mark since his rookie season nine years earlier, yet posted his highest scoring average in six years. And playing with Jason Kidd during the season's second half allowed K.J. to spot-up for more threes, although Johnson's three-point percentage was not better in 32 regular season games with Kidd that year (.439) than in 38 games without Kidd (.443). But Kidd's presence enabled K.J. to look for his shot, and for three-pointers, more frequently, given that there was a second elite playmaker to help make sure that Rex Chapman, Wesley Person, Danny Manning, Cedric Ceballos, Wayman Tisdale, and the rest of the Suns received their touches and shots.

In this highlight compilation from Game Four of the 1989 Western Conference Finals, you can see K.J. bury a catch-and-shoot three, after the 7:30 mark of the video.

[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rwD4p2bWfsc]LAL @ PHX - 1989 WCF - Gm 4 - YouTube[/ame]

Notably, he attempts the shot with the Suns down by eight points and slightly over three minutes remaining, while facing elimination. And significantly, K.J.'s shot constitutes Phoenix's first made three of the entire game. Then at the very end of the game, K.J. shoots another catch-and-shoot three, one that rattles out of the cylinder. In that series, he actually shot 2-3 on threes after shooting 2-22 on threes during the regular season, another indication that he could have been more of a three-point shooter over the course of his career, but he really possessed little incentive to shoot threes because of all his other offensive assets.

This game from November 30, 1991, constitutes a case in point.

11/30/1991 NBA Box Score at PHO - basketballreference.com

Trailing 119-116 with about ten seconds left, K.J. buried a three against John Stockton to tie the game and send it to overtime. Then in overtime with the score tied 124-124, K.J. buried another three to give the Suns the lead for good. He finished 2-2 on threes, having not attempted any before there were ten seconds remaining in regulation, and the rest of his teammates finished 0-2 on threes. As you can see from the box score, Hornacek did not attempt a three; neither did Stockton, or Utah's other starting guard, Jeff Malone. The Jazz finished 1-5 on threes, so aside from K.J., the rest of the game's players combined to shoot 1-7 on threes. As I said earlier, the NBA proved that much different then, and K.J. generally only looked for the shot in the occasional late-game situation. Thus a disproportionate number of his rare three-point attempts amounted to half-court heaves at the ends of quarters, desperate launches off broken plays with the shot clock about to expire, and so forth.

A game almost two months later, on January 24, 1992, at Boston, provided another example of only really looking for the three in a pivotal situation. With the Suns leading 93-91 and a little over a minute remaining, K.J. rebounded a Robert Parish miss and drained his only three-point attempt of the contest, basically putting the game away.

01/24/1992 NBA Box Score at BOS - basketballreference.com

The Suns actually shot 6-9 on threes in the game, including a 2-2 performance by Hornacek. The Celtics shot 0-1 on threes as a team.

By the way, after hitting that three, K.J. tied up Sherman Douglas to force a jump-ball, won the tip, sank two free throws, stripped the ball from Rick Fox, sank two more free throws (he scored Phoenix's final seven points), and then blocked a shot by Douglas to end the game. The Celtic point guards, Douglas and John Bagley, combined to score 7 points on 3-12 shooting from the field, and Bledsoe and Dragic possess the potential to impact the game on both ends in K.J.'s manner.

Now, here, late in the fourth quarter of Game Four of the 1994 Western Conference Semifinals, you can see K.J. bury a three off the dribble in transition (it comes after the first two possessions):

[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oVcSndz52DE]Kevin Johnson posterize Olajuwon 1994 WCSF G4 - YouTube[/ame]

K.J. shot 2-3 on threes in that game (you see two of the attempts in the video) and 1-2 in the previous game, for a two-game total of 3-5. Of the five attempts, three came late in the fourth quarters with the Suns down, and K.J. hit two of them. Earlier in the fourth quarter of Game Four, K.J. buried a twenty-three-foot jumper with his foot on the line, making him 4-6 from twenty-three feet and out over those two games (3-4 in the fourth quarters).

At here, at about the 1:40 mark of this video, K.J. hits a catch-and-shoot three in the second quarter of Game Four of the 1995 Western Conference Semifinals at Houston. Later in the video, K.J. buries a three off the dribble (he shot 2-2 on threes for the game) and hits another long jumper with his foot on the line.

[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dB_xKFIJgg]Kevin Johnson: 43 Point Game Vs Houston (1995 Playoffs) - YouTube[/ame]

During that broadcast, Bill Walton actually noted that Phoenix head coach Paul Westphal, or the Suns' coaching staff in general, had been encouraging K.J. to shoot the three more often, and that K.J. often stepped on the line. In the third quarter of Game Seven of that series, K.J. buried another catch-and-shoot three, this one in the right corner off a pass from Charles Barkley in the post. If you want to see that one, send me a private message.

Overall in that series, K.J. shot 5-10 on threes, sinking more threes in the 1995 Western Conference Semifinals than he had in the entire '94-'95 regular season. Then in the '95-'96 opener, K.J. shot 3-3 on threes and converted at a combined .425 clip over the course of the next two seasons, rendering him a top-ten three-point percentage shooter over that time, and sixth among players who averaged at least 2.0 attempts per game during those two seasons (slightly ahead of Stockton's .422). But the point is that K.J. sort of needed to be coaxed into shooting threes after years of neither needing nor wanting to do so. Larry Bird was actually similar. He constituted an incredible shooter, but over four early seasons from 1981-1984, Bird shot just .257 on threes in 0.9 attempts per game.

Larry Bird NBA & ABA Stats | Basketball-Reference.com

Allegedly, neither Bird nor his first NBA head coach, Bill Fitch, liked the idea of shooting threes, but eventually he realized that he could use the shot to his team's advantage.

I don't think that Bledsoe will ever rank third in the NBA in three-point field goal percentage, like K.J. in 1997, but I do believe that he will prove sufficient as a three-point shooter (to the extent that he even needs to take them). And in terms of catching-and-shooting, to me, if you can shoot off the dribble, then you can catch-and-shoot. The issue, again, is simply comfort, experience, and familiarity, because if you're accustomed to playing with the ball in your hands, then hovering on the perimeter and shooting off the catch is more of a foreign experience. Even Nash, one of the greatest shooters in history, sometimes seemed uncomfortable last year in his new role as a spot-up shooter waiting for kick-out passes from Kobe Bryant.

Back to Hornacek and K.J. for a moment, that situation really was quite a bit different from this one with Dragic and Bledsoe. At the time that the Suns traded for K.J., the Suns liked Hornacek well enough to keep him, but he was a second-year, second-round draft pick and not someone that Phoenix was building around. For the first two games of the '88-'89 season, Hornacek actually came off the bench, with a rookie Dan Majerle starting at shooting guard. Head coach Cotton Fitzsimmons also tried Majerle, rather than Hornacek, as a starter for two games in December 1989, again in a quest for greater size and sturdiness defensively. But each year, after the brief experiments with Majerle as the starting shooting guard, Fitzsimmons decided that he needed Hornacek's shooting in the starting lineup—not necessarily his three-point shooting, but his shooting in general.

 

[GMATCa]

(continued)

Fortunately, in today's NBA, the big post-up guards like Jordan, Drexler, and Magic are almost all gone. The only one that's really left is Kobe Bryant, and he's on his last legs. Indeed, what's more of a question is whether the offensive chemistry between Dragic and Bledsoe can hold. With K.J. and Hornacek, the issue was simpler: in training camp in the autumn of 1988, Fitzsimmons told Johnson, "This is going to be your team. We're going to go as far as you can take us." Hornacek's point guard skills made the Suns more versatile, in the sense that they allowed Phoenix to play faster, giving the team more ways of advancing the ball rather than constantly needing K.J., the true point guard, to initiate the attack. And if the opposition was covering K.J. in the back-court, or if a half-court play broke down around the point guard, then the Suns were not stuck. That's an issue that Rick Barry addressed here, in an article from December 1990:

Barry: The trend, if there is one, is going to the point of having more than one guy capable of handling the ball. ...

... Look at teams like Phoenix. Jeff Hornacek is capable of doing some of that, so they have a bonus. And look at Utah. They're hurting, because if they go away from John Stockton, they're not the same team. You run into a serious problem if you're relying on one guy who's just a great, great player playing point guard and you don't have someone else to handle it.

Sports | Barry, Issel Speak Out On Situation With Point Guards | Seattle Times Newspaper

And then in '88-'89, Hornacek served as the backup point guard when K.J. was resting, a role that Hornacek also filled in the 1989 and 1990 playoffs, or whenever the Suns did not want to go to their putative backup point guard.

Overall, though, there was no ambiguity about who was running the show. Cotton Fitzsimmons didn't even criticize K.J. in front of the team because he believed in handling your team's point guard in private, and he didn't call plays. Instead, he taught guys the right way to play the game offensively, emphasized defense, and trusted K.J. at the controls. Conversely, in the case of Dragic and Bledsoe, there is no ultimate quarterback.

But I think that the Dragic and Bledsoe dynamic can continue to work because when you spread the court with three-point shooting and the Suns' multiple 'stretch fours,' you create plenty of space. And when there's plenty of space, there's room for two point guards to thrive without necessarily stepping on each other's toes.